ghsa-rwf6-8284-hxfr
Vulnerability from github
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: make cow_file_range_inline() honor locked_page on error
The btrfs buffered write path runs through __extent_writepage() which has some tricky return value handling for writepage_delalloc(). Specifically, when that returns 1, we exit, but for other return values we continue and end up calling btrfs_folio_end_all_writers(). If the folio has been unlocked (note that we check the PageLocked bit at the start of __extent_writepage()), this results in an assert panic like this one from syzbot:
BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in free_log_tree:3267: errno=-5 IO failure
BTRFS warning (device loop0 state EAL): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in cleanup_transaction:2018: errno=-5 IO failure
assertion failed: folio_test_locked(folio), in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted
6.10.0-syzkaller-05505-gb1bc554e009e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 06/27/2024
RIP: 0010:btrfs_folio_end_all_writers+0x55b/0x610 fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871
Code: e9 d3 fb ff ff e8 25 22 c2 fd 48 c7 c7 c0 3c 0e 8c 48 c7 c6 80 3d
0e 8c 48 c7 c2 60 3c 0e 8c b9 67 03 00 00 e8 66 47 ad 07 90 <0f> 0b e8
6e 45 b0 07 4c 89 ff be 08 00 00 00 e8 21 12 25 fe 4c 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc900033d72e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 00fff0000000402c RCX: 663b7a08c50a0a00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc900033d73b0 R08: ffffffff8176b98c R09: 1ffff9200067adfc
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200067adfd R12: 0000000000000001
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffea0001cbee80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5f076012f8 CR3: 000000000e134000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
I was hitting the same issue by doing hundreds of accelerated runs of generic/475, which also hits IO errors by design.
I instrumented that reproducer with bpftrace and found that the undesirable folio_unlock was coming from the following callstack:
folio_unlock+5 __process_pages_contig+475 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.0+230 cow_file_range+803 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+566 writepage_delalloc+332 __extent_writepage # inlined in my stacktrace, but I added it here extent_write_cache_pages+622
Looking at the bisected-to pa ---truncated---
{ "affected": [], "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-42266" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [], "github_reviewed": false, "github_reviewed_at": null, "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-17T09:15:07Z", "severity": null }, "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: make cow_file_range_inline() honor locked_page on error\n\nThe btrfs buffered write path runs through __extent_writepage() which\nhas some tricky return value handling for writepage_delalloc().\nSpecifically, when that returns 1, we exit, but for other return values\nwe continue and end up calling btrfs_folio_end_all_writers(). If the\nfolio has been unlocked (note that we check the PageLocked bit at the\nstart of __extent_writepage()), this results in an assert panic like\nthis one from syzbot:\n\n BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in free_log_tree:3267: errno=-5 IO failure\n BTRFS warning (device loop0 state EAL): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.\n BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in cleanup_transaction:2018: errno=-5 IO failure\n assertion failed: folio_test_locked(folio), in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871!\n Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\n CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted\n 6.10.0-syzkaller-05505-gb1bc554e009e #0\n Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS\n Google 06/27/2024\n RIP: 0010:btrfs_folio_end_all_writers+0x55b/0x610 fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871\n Code: e9 d3 fb ff ff e8 25 22 c2 fd 48 c7 c7 c0 3c 0e 8c 48 c7 c6 80 3d\n 0e 8c 48 c7 c2 60 3c 0e 8c b9 67 03 00 00 e8 66 47 ad 07 90 \u003c0f\u003e 0b e8\n 6e 45 b0 07 4c 89 ff be 08 00 00 00 e8 21 12 25 fe 4c 89\n RSP: 0018:ffffc900033d72e0 EFLAGS: 00010246\n RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 00fff0000000402c RCX: 663b7a08c50a0a00\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n RBP: ffffc900033d73b0 R08: ffffffff8176b98c R09: 1ffff9200067adfc\n R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200067adfd R12: 0000000000000001\n R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffea0001cbee80\n FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000)\n knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 00007f5f076012f8 CR3: 000000000e134000 CR4: 00000000003506f0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __extent_writepage fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1597 [inline]\n extent_write_cache_pages fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2251 [inline]\n btrfs_writepages+0x14d7/0x2760 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2373\n do_writepages+0x359/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2656\n filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x125/0x180 mm/filemap.c:397\n __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:430 [inline]\n __filemap_fdatawrite mm/filemap.c:436 [inline]\n filemap_flush+0xdf/0x130 mm/filemap.c:463\n btrfs_release_file+0x117/0x130 fs/btrfs/file.c:1547\n __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422\n task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:222\n exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]\n do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:877\n do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1026\n __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1037 [inline]\n __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]\n __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1035\n x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640\n arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n RIP: 0033:0x7f5f075b70c9\n Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at\n 0x7f5f075b709f.\n\nI was hitting the same issue by doing hundreds of accelerated runs of\ngeneric/475, which also hits IO errors by design.\n\nI instrumented that reproducer with bpftrace and found that the\nundesirable folio_unlock was coming from the following callstack:\n\n folio_unlock+5\n __process_pages_contig+475\n cow_file_range_inline.constprop.0+230\n cow_file_range+803\n btrfs_run_delalloc_range+566\n writepage_delalloc+332\n __extent_writepage # inlined in my stacktrace, but I added it here\n extent_write_cache_pages+622\n\nLooking at the bisected-to pa\n---truncated---", "id": "GHSA-rwf6-8284-hxfr", "modified": "2024-08-17T09:30:24Z", "published": "2024-08-17T09:30:24Z", "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42266" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/061e41581606000a83ce0f0f01d6ad338f3704e9" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478574370bef7951fbd9ef5155537d6cbed49472" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [] }
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.