ghsa-jc7w-c686-c4v9
Vulnerability from github
Summary
It is possible to put data in front of an LZMA-encoded byte stream without detecting the situation while reading the header. This can lead to increased memory consumption because the current implementation allocates the full decoding buffer directly after reading the header. The LZMA header doesn't include a magic number or has a checksum to detect such an issue according to the specification.
Note that the code recognizes the issue later while reading the stream, but at this time the memory allocation has already been done.
Mitigations
The release v0.5.15 includes following mitigations:
- The ReaderConfig DictCap field is now interpreted as a limit for the dictionary size.
- The default is 2 Gigabytes - 1 byte (2^31-1 bytes).
- Users can check with the [Reader.Header] method what the actual values are in their LZMA files and set a smaller limit using ReaderConfig.
- The dictionary size will not exceed the larger of the file size and the minimum dictionary size. This is another measure to prevent huge memory allocations for the dictionary.
- The code supports stream sizes only up to a pebibyte (1024^5).
Note that the original v0.5.14 version had a compiler error for 32 bit platforms, which has been fixed by v0.5.15.
Methods affected
Only software that uses lzma.NewReader or lzma.ReaderConfig.NewReader is affected. There is no issue for software using the xz functionality.
I thank @GregoryBuligin for his report, which is provided below.
Summary
When unpacking a large number of LZMA archives, even in a single goroutine, if the first byte of the archive file is 0 (a zero byte added to the beginning), an error writeMatch: distance out of range occurs. Memory consumption spikes sharply, and the GC clearly cannot handle this situation.
Details
Judging by the error writeMatch: distance out of range, the problems occur in the code around this function. https://github.com/ulikunitz/xz/blob/c8314b8f21e9c5e25b52da07544cac14db277e89/lzma/decoderdict.go#L81
PoC
Run a function similar to this one in 1 or several goroutines on a multitude of LZMA archives that have a 0 (a zero byte) added to the beginning. ``` const ProjectLocalPath = "some/path" const TmpDir = "tmp"
func UnpackLZMA(lzmaFile string) error { file, err := os.Open(lzmaFile) if err != nil { return err } defer file.Close()
reader, err := lzma.NewReader(bufio.NewReader(file))
if err != nil {
return err
}
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp(TmpDir, TmpLZMAPrefix)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
tmpFile.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
}()
sha256Hasher := sha256.New()
multiWriter := io.MultiWriter(tmpFile, sha256Hasher)
if _, err = io.Copy(multiWriter, reader); err != nil {
return err
}
unpackHash := hex.EncodeToString(sha256Hasher.Sum(nil))
unpackDir := filepath.Join(
ProjectLocalPath, unpackHash[:2],
)
_ = os.MkdirAll(unpackDir, DirPerm)
unpackPath := filepath.Join(unpackDir, unpackHash)
return os.Rename(tmpFile.Name(), unpackPath)
} ```
Impact
Servers with a small amount of RAM that download and unpack a large number of unverified LZMA archives
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ulikunitz/xz"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58058"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-28T19:36:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-28T22:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIt is possible to put data in front of an LZMA-encoded byte stream without detecting the situation while reading the header. This can lead to increased memory consumption because the current implementation allocates the full decoding buffer directly after reading the header. The LZMA header doesn\u0027t include a magic number or has a checksum to detect such an issue according to the [specification](https://github.com/jljusten/LZMA-SDK/blob/master/DOC/lzma-specification.txt).\n\nNote that the code recognizes the issue later while reading the stream, but at this time the memory allocation has already been done.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nThe release v0.5.15 includes following mitigations:\n\n- The ReaderConfig DictCap field is now interpreted as a limit for the dictionary size.\n- The default is 2 Gigabytes - 1 byte (2^31-1 bytes).\n- Users can check with the [Reader.Header] method what the actual values are in their LZMA files and set a smaller limit using ReaderConfig.\n- The dictionary size will not exceed the larger of the file size and the minimum dictionary size. This is another measure to prevent huge memory allocations for the dictionary.\n- The code supports stream sizes only up to a pebibyte (1024^5).\n\nNote that the original v0.5.14 version had a compiler error for 32 bit platforms, which has been fixed by v0.5.15.\n\n### Methods affected\n\nOnly software that uses [lzma.NewReader](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ulikunitz/xz/lzma#NewReader) or [lzma.ReaderConfig.NewReader](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/ulikunitz/xz/lzma#ReaderConfig.NewReader) is affected. There is no issue for software using the xz functionality.\n\nI thank @GregoryBuligin for his report, which is provided below.\n\n### Summary\nWhen unpacking a large number of LZMA archives, even in a single goroutine, if the first byte of the archive file is 0 (a zero byte added to the beginning), an error __writeMatch: distance out of range__ occurs. Memory consumption spikes sharply, and the GC clearly cannot handle this situation.\n\n### Details\nJudging by the error __writeMatch: distance out of range__, the problems occur in the code around this function.\nhttps://github.com/ulikunitz/xz/blob/c8314b8f21e9c5e25b52da07544cac14db277e89/lzma/decoderdict.go#L81\n\n### PoC\nRun a function similar to this one in 1 or several goroutines on a multitude of LZMA archives that have a 0 (a zero byte) added to the beginning.\n```\nconst ProjectLocalPath = \"some/path\"\nconst TmpDir = \"tmp\"\n\nfunc UnpackLZMA(lzmaFile string) error {\n\tfile, err := os.Open(lzmaFile)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer file.Close()\n\n\treader, err := lzma.NewReader(bufio.NewReader(file))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\ttmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp(TmpDir, TmpLZMAPrefix)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\ttmpFile.Close()\n\t\t_ = os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())\n\t}()\n\n\tsha256Hasher := sha256.New()\n\tmultiWriter := io.MultiWriter(tmpFile, sha256Hasher)\n\n\tif _, err = io.Copy(multiWriter, reader); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\tunpackHash := hex.EncodeToString(sha256Hasher.Sum(nil))\n\tunpackDir := filepath.Join(\n\t\tProjectLocalPath, unpackHash[:2],\n\t)\n\t_ = os.MkdirAll(unpackDir, DirPerm)\n\n\tunpackPath := filepath.Join(unpackDir, unpackHash)\n\n\treturn os.Rename(tmpFile.Name(), unpackPath)\n}\n```\n\n\n\n### Impact\nServers with a small amount of RAM that download and unpack a large number of unverified LZMA archives",
"id": "GHSA-jc7w-c686-c4v9",
"modified": "2025-08-29T20:25:38Z",
"published": "2025-08-28T19:36:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ulikunitz/xz/security/advisories/GHSA-jc7w-c686-c4v9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ulikunitz/xz/commit/88ddf1d0d98d688db65de034f48960b2760d2ae2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ulikunitz/xz"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "github.com/ulikunitz/xz leaks memory when decoding a corrupted multiple LZMA archives"
}
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.