ghsa-733v-p3h5-qpq7
Vulnerability from github
Summary
A query cost restriction using the cost-limit
can be bypassed if ignoreIntrospection
is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment __schema
.
Details
At the start of the computeComplexity
function, we have the following check for ignoreIntrospection
option:
ts
if (this.config.ignoreIntrospection && 'name' in node && node.name?.value === '__schema') {
return 0;
}
However, the node
can be FieldNode | FragmentDefinitionNode | InlineFragmentNode | OperationDefinitionNode | FragmentSpreadNode
So, for example, sending the following query
gql
query hello {
books {
title
}
}
would create an OperationDefinitionNode
with node.name.value == 'hello'
The proper way to handle this would be to check for the __schema
field, which would create a FieldNode
.
The fix is
ts
if (
this.config.ignoreIntrospection &&
'name' in node &&
node.name?.value === '__schema' &&
node.kind === Kind.FIELD
) {
return 0;
}
to assert that the node must be a FieldNode
PoC
```gql query { ...__schema }
fragment __schema on Query { books { title author } } ```
gql
query __schema {
books {
title
author
}
}
Impact
Applications using GraphQL Armor Cost Limit plugin with ignoreIntrospection
enabled.
Fix:
Fixed on 772. A quick patch would be to set ignoreIntrospection
to false.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "npm", "name": "@escape.tech/graphql-armor-cost-limit" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "2.4.2" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-400", "CWE-770" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-25T15:14:36Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "MODERATE" }, "details": "### Summary\nA query cost restriction using the `cost-limit` can be bypassed if `ignoreIntrospection` is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment `__schema`.\n\n### Details\nAt the start of the `computeComplexity` function, we have the following check for `ignoreIntrospection` option:\n\n```ts\n if (this.config.ignoreIntrospection \u0026\u0026 \u0027name\u0027 in node \u0026\u0026 node.name?.value === \u0027__schema\u0027) {\n return 0;\n }\n```\n\nHowever, the `node` can be `FieldNode | FragmentDefinitionNode | InlineFragmentNode | OperationDefinitionNode | FragmentSpreadNode`\n\nSo, for example, sending the following query\n\n```gql\nquery hello {\n books {\n title\n }\n}\n```\n\nwould create an `OperationDefinitionNode` with `node.name.value == \u0027hello\u0027`\n\nThe proper way to handle this would be to check for the `__schema` field, which would create a `FieldNode`.\n\nThe fix is\n\n```ts\n if (\n this.config.ignoreIntrospection \u0026\u0026\n \u0027name\u0027 in node \u0026\u0026\n node.name?.value === \u0027__schema\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n node.kind === Kind.FIELD\n ) {\n return 0;\n }\n```\n\nto assert that the node must be a `FieldNode`\n\n### PoC\n```gql\nquery {\n ...__schema\n}\n\nfragment __schema on Query {\n books {\n title\n author\n }\n}\n```\n\n```gql\nquery __schema {\n books {\n title\n author\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nApplications using GraphQL Armor Cost Limit plugin with `ignoreIntrospection` enabled.\n\n### Fix:\nFixed on [772](https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/pull/772). A quick patch would be to set `ignoreIntrospection` to false.", "id": "GHSA-733v-p3h5-qpq7", "modified": "2025-04-29T16:45:56Z", "published": "2025-04-25T15:14:36Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/security/advisories/GHSA-733v-p3h5-qpq7" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/pull/772" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/commit/5a329541cf32a359ee1f69748738f91231b26eba" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "GraphQL Armor Cost-Limit Plugin Bypass via Introspection Query Obfuscation" }
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.