ghsa-3j4h-h3fp-vwww
Vulnerability from github
Summary
Paying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight.
Details
Using blocking: true
on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn't send a reply.
https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138
This is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after: https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L141 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L146
The best way to fix this is to check the payment status after an error, and when not sure, always consider a payment still in flight.
PoC
A very simple way to exploit this is: - Create a hold invoice - Pay the invoice with the LNbits server backed by an Eclair node, until it times out - Settle the hold invoice
Impact
This vulnerability can lead to a total loss of funds for the node backend.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "PyPI", "name": "lnbits" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "0.12.6" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-34694" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-754" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-17T21:24:18Z", "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-14T15:15:50Z", "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Summary\n\nPaying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight.\n\n### Details\n\nUsing `blocking: true` on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: `Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn\u0027t send a reply.`\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138\n\nThis is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after:\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L141\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L146\n\nThe best way to fix this is to check the payment status after an error, and when not sure, always consider a payment still in flight.\n\n### PoC\n\nA very simple way to exploit this is:\n- Create a hold invoice\n- Pay the invoice with the LNbits server backed by an Eclair node, until it times out\n- Settle the hold invoice\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to a total loss of funds for the node backend.\n", "id": "GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww", "modified": "2024-06-17T21:24:18Z", "published": "2024-06-17T21:24:18Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/security/advisories/GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34694" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "LNbits improperly handles potential network and payment failures when using Eclair backend" }
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.